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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4512

ADOLPHUS NOEL MCNEIL,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A41-929-486)

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on February 1, 2007

Before: BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
*IRENAS, District Judge
( Filed: August 27, 2007 )

*The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of
New Jersey, sitting by designation.

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Adolphus McNeil petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denying his request for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of
removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). We
will affirm the BIA’s order finding McNeil ineligible for withholding of removal and
cancellation of removal. We will vacate the BIA’s finding that McNeil’s past conviction of
criminal sale of marijuana constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)
that subjects McNeil to removal and remand this case for further proceedings to determine
whether McNeil timely applied for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. 208.4(a)(2).
I. Factual and Procedural History
Pennsylvania State Police arrested McNeil on April 23, 1998, near Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, and charged him with possession of marijuana and possession of stolen
property. McNeil had entered the United States on or about May 14, 1988, as a lawful
permanent resident from Guyana. The police conducted a records check revealing three
convictions from New York. McNeil had been convicted twice, in October 1989 and
February 1990, for possession of marijuana.1 He had also been convicted in May 1990 for
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Violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 221.10.
2

the sale of marijuana.2 McNeil was released to the INS. On April 28, 1998, the INS served
McNeil with a notice to appear, charging him with being removable from the United States
because of his prior convictions. On December 21, 1998, an Immigration Judge (IJ) found
that McNeil was removable because of his prior convictions for controlled substance
violations. The IJ denied McNeil’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
cancellation of removal because McNeil had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The
IJ ordered McNeil removed to Guyana.
McNeil filed a timely notice of appeal with the BIA. On March 20, 2002, the BIA
affirmed part of the IJ’s decision and remanded the record to the IJ for further consideration.
The BIA found that the record sufficiently established McNeil’s three New York convictions
and that McNeil’s conviction for criminal sale, a drug-trafficking crime, was an aggravated
felony subjecting McNeil to removal and barring him from applying for asylum. The BIA
remanded the case to the IJ to determine whether McNeil’s aggravated felony conviction
constituted a conviction for a particularly serious crime that would make him ineligible for
withholding of removal. The BIA also found that McNeil, on remand, was entitled to apply
for a waiver of deportation.3 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996).
The remanded proceedings were continued several times for various reasons,
including to allow McNeil to resolve an outstanding bench warrant in New Jersey. McNeil
2

Violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 221.40.
3

McNeil has not raised the issue of his eligibility for a waiver of deportation in this
petition for review.
3

was ordered removed, in absentia, after neither he nor his counsel appeared at a June 10,
2003, hearing. McNeil’s case was subsequently reopened, and the venue changed to York,
Pennsylvania. During a hearing on January 2, 2004, the IJ addressed the effect that
McNeil’s two additional convictions – a New Jersey conviction (January 30, 1998) for
possession of over fifty grams of marijuana and a Pennsylvania conviction (January 5, 1999)
for possession of a small quantity of marijuana – had on his eligibility for a waiver of
deportation, and continued the case to allow both sides to research the issue. McNeil
subsequently filed a “Motion for New Adjudication” asking the IJ to adjudicate the
correctness of the BIA’s determination that his New York conviction for the sale of
marijuana constituted an aggravated felony in light of Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130 (3d
Cir. 2001), and to permit him to apply for cancellation of removal, in addition to applying
for a waiver of deportation. In response, the Government filed a Form I-261, Additional
Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability, supplementing its original allegations with the
additional allegations of McNeil’s 1998 and 1999 convictions. The Government also filed
a “Declaration in Opposition” to McNeil’s “Motion for New Adjudication.”
On February 6, 2004, the IJ denied McNeil’s motion to request protection under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) because the case had been remanded
only to consider whether McNeil was eligible for withholding of removal.4 The IJ also
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United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
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asked McNeil if he wished to offer any evidence on whether his crime was particularly
serious, but McNeil stated that he was no longer requesting withholding of removal. On
February 10, 2004, the IJ forwarded McNeil’s case to the BIA with a request for
certification. The certification asked the BIA to consider our holding in Steele and whether
it had any effect on the BIA’s determination that McNeil’s conviction constituted an
aggravated felony. The IJ also notified the BIA of McNeil’s 1998 and 1999 controlled
substance convictions.
On September 6, 2005, the BIA considered the certification from the IJ. The BIA
declined to reconsider its March 20, 2002, decision finding McNeil an aggravated felon
because Steele was neither intervening case law nor relevant to McNeil’s removability as an
aggravated felon. The BIA also declined McNeil’s “Motion for New Adjudication” of its
March 20, 2002, decision finding McNeil removable as an aggravated felon because McNeil
had exceeded the time and number limitations for motions to reopen. The BIA then noted
its agreement with the IJ that McNeil’s 1998 and 1999 convictions prohibited him from
being eligible for a waiver of deportation because he remained removable as a result of his
controlled substance violations. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s decision that McNeil was
ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was an aggravated felon and he had failed
to acquire the required length of residence prior to his 1990 conviction. The BIA dismissed
McNeil’s appeal, and he subsequently filed this petition for review.
McNeil’s counsel did not submit a brief prior to the BIA’s consideration of the
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certification from the IJ. Apparently, a copy of the certification and briefing schedule had
been sent to his counsel’s office, but she was in the process of moving and did not receive
the briefing schedule. It is undisputed that McNeil received a copy of the certification and
briefing schedule.
II. Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction over McNeil's petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D). See Ng v. Att'y Gen., 436 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that our
jurisdiction extends to “questions of law raised upon a petition for review,” including
petitions for review of removal orders based on aggravated felony convictions). We exercise
plenary review over McNeil's legal argument that he was not convicted of an aggravated
felony. See Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 2005).
III. Analysis
McNeil does not dispute that his four marijuana related convictions qualify as
“controlled substance violations” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), thus subjecting him to
removal. McNeil contends that the IJ and BIA improperly found that his conviction under
N.Y. Penal Law § 221.40 was an aggravated felony. Aliens convicted of an aggravated
felony are ineligible for discretionary relief from an order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(3) (cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. §
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1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (withholding of removal).5 McNeil claims that because of this legal error
he was deprived of the opportunity to apply for asylum, withholding of removal and
cancellation of removal. McNeil also claims his due process rights were violated because
the IJ refused to consider his petition under CAT and his attorney was unable to file an
appellate brief on the issues certified to the BIA.
At the outset, we will affirm in part the BIA’s decision that McNeil is ineligible for
withholding of removal and cancellation of removal. Individuals seeking withholding of
removal may not do so if they are deemed by the Attorney General to have committed a
particularly serious crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(ii). During the remanded proceedings
before the IJ, McNeil declined to offer any evidence disputing whether he had committed
a particularly serious crime, and he stated his intent to no longer seek withholding of
removal. Therefore, McNeil failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(d). McNeil is also ineligible for cancellation of removal. Cancellation of removal is

5

Individuals seeking to obtain withholding of removal may not do so if they are deemed
by the Attorney General to have committed a particularly serious crime. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(ii) (person not removable if the Attorney General decides that “the alien, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the
community of the United States”). For purposes of clause (ii), an alien who has been
convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an
aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a
particularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General
from determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been
convicted of a particularly serious crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(iv). It is presumed a drug
trafficking crime is “a particularly serious crime” regardless of the length of the sentence or
whether the offense was an aggravated felony, but this presumption can be overcome in
certain circumstances. See Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 276-77 (BIA 2002).
7

only available to aliens who have resided in the United States continuously for seven years
after being admitted in any status. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). The continuous period ends
when the alien has committed an offense that would render the alien removable under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B). McNeil was convicted of multiple
marijuana convictions in 1989 and 1990, less than two years after being admitted as a lawful
permanent resident, making him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and ineligible
for cancellation of removal.
We will also deny McNeil’s request that he be permitted to apply for relief under
CAT. McNeil first sought relief under CAT in the remanded proceedings before the IJ on
February 6, 2004. However, McNeil failed to raise his CAT claim before the BIA in the
certified proceedings after the IJ refused to consider the CAT claim. We find McNeil
waived his argument for relief under CAT by not raising it before the BIA. Abdulrahman
v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). Although it is
unfortunate McNeil was unable to file a brief before the BIA decided his case, there is no
question that he received a copy of the briefing schedule around August 19, 2005, even if
his counsel did not. McNeil bore some responsibility for communicating with his attorney.
Nor does his counsel’s failure to receive the briefing schedule, due at least in part to her
failure to inform the BIA of her impending move, violate McNeil’s right to due process
where he personally received the notice of certification and a copy of the briefing schedule.
Chong v. District Director, 264 F.3d 378, 386 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The fundamental
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requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”).
Nonetheless, we will remand this case for further proceedings to determine whether
McNeil timely applied for asylum. Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2), an alien filing for asylum
must do so within one year of the alien’s last arrival in the United States or by April 1, 1997,
whichever is later. If an application for asylum is filed after the deadline has passed, the IJ
or the BIA must determine whether the alien qualifies for an exception to the deadline.
Under Section 298 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B),
changed circumstances that materially affect an applicant’s eligibility for asylum or
extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing the application by the deadline
may qualify the alien for an exception.

To qualify, the alien bears the burden of

demonstrating changed or extraordinary circumstances to the satisfaction of the Attorney
General. Since McNeil arrived in the United States in May 1988, he was required to file for
asylum by April 1, 1997. He failed to meet this deadline and only asserted that he wished
to apply for asylum at his hearing before IJ on December 21, 1998. Although the deadline
for applying for asylum had passed, the IJ failed to determine whether McNeil qualified for
an exception to the filing deadline. Instead, the IJ immediately denied McNeil’s application
for asylum on the basis that he was convicted of an aggravated felony. A factual
determination must first be made, on remand, whether McNeil qualifies for an exception to
apply for asylum. If McNeil does, in fact, demonstrate the existence of changed conditions
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to the satisfaction of the Attorney General to justify his untimely application for asylum, then
his application for asylum must be considered on its merits because the BIA’s finding that
McNeil’s prior conviction for criminal sale of marijuana constitutes an aggravated felony
is erroneous as explained below. Otherwise, if McNeil is unable to demonstrate changed
conditions, then he cannot apply for asylum because his application was untimely.
Although the IJ and BIA both found that McNeil’s conviction for criminal sale
constituted an aggravated felony, we find this to be incorrect. McNeil has consistently
maintained that his New York conviction for criminal sale did not constitute an aggravated
felony, and he has raised this argument in each administrative proceeding. This Court has
recognized two routes for determining whether a state drug conviction, for deportation
purposes, constitutes an “aggravated felony.” Under the first route (known as the “illicit
trafficking in any controlled substance” route), the drug offense must (1) be a felony under
the state law; and (2) contain a trafficking element, the unlawful trading or dealing of a
controlled substance. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 2002).6 The second
route (known as the “hypothetical felony” route) requires that the offense, however

6

Generally, when determining whether an alien's conviction is for an aggravated felony,
the court may look only to the statutory definition of the offense, and may not consider the
particular facts underlying a conviction. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147-48 (3d
Cir.2004). There is, however, an exception to this “categorical” approach that permits a
court to look beyond the face of the statute to the charging instrument where the statute of
conviction is phrased in the disjunctive. Id. at 162-63; see also Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d
203, 214 (3d Cir. 2002) (examining underlying facts where “some, but not all” convictions
under statute would qualify as aggravated felony). In this case the record fails to disclose any
of the facts underlying McNeil’s conviction.
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characterized by the state, be punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances
Act (CSA). Id. at 306. Because McNeil’s convictions were misdemeanors under state law,
the aggravated felony determination must be made under the “hypothetical felony” route.
McNeil was convicted of violating N.Y. Penal Law § 221.40, which states that “[a]
person is guilty of criminal sale of [marijuana] in the fourth degree when he knowingly and
unlawfully sells [marijuana] except as provided in § 221.35 of this article.” This class A
misdemeanor carries a sentence that “shall not exceed one year.” N.Y. Penal Law §§ 70.15
and 221.40. Under N.Y. Penal Law § 221.35, an individual who “knowingly and unlawfully
sells, without consideration, one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances
containing [marijuana] and the preparations, mixtures or substances are of an aggregate
weight of two grams or less; or one cigarette containing [marijuana]” is penalized for the
criminal sale of marijuana. An offense would not be included in § 221.35 (and would be
included in § 221.40) either if the sale was (1) for consideration; or (2) for an amount of
more than two grams or one cigarette. See N.Y. Penal Law § 221.35. Under New York law,
“sell” is defined as “to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to
do the same.” N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00.
An individual may violate § 221.40 without that conviction qualifying as a federal
felony. See Steele, 236 F.3d at 130. If an individual either sells for consideration less than
two grams or one cigarette of marijuana or distributes without consideration more than two
grams or one cigarette of marijuana (but less than 25 grams) then he has violated § 221.40
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because the crime is not encompassed by § 221.35 (but has not risen to the 25 grams level
of N.Y. Penal Law § 221.45). That state misdemeanor would not be a federal felony if it fell
within the scope of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4). Under § 841(b)(4), an individual who
“distribut[es] a small amount of [marijuana] for no remuneration” shall be punished as if for
simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844. A simple possession conviction under § 844 is
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of one year, unless the individual has a
prior narcotics conviction, which increases the maximum sentence to a period of two years.
21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), a simple possession conviction without a
prior narcotics conviction would be a federal misdemeanor (less than one year
imprisonment), but the two year maximum sentence conviction would be a federal felony.
Thus, a violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 221.40 is not categorically an “aggravated felony”
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
This Court’s precedents foreclose McNeil from being considered an aggravated felon
under the “hypothetical felony” route based on his subsequent convictions. See Steele, 236
F.3d at 138; Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 300. In Steele and Gerbier we acknowledged that the
CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), contains a sentence enhancement if there is a prior drug conviction
under state or federal law that would result in a second misdemeanor conviction being
considered a felony under the CSA. 236 F.3d at 138; 280 F.3d at 300. We held that “a prior
conviction cannot be used to enhance a sentence for purposes of determining whether the
alien has been convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ when his prior conviction was never
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litigated as part of the criminal proceeding in the crime for which the alien is being
deported.” Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 300. McNeil’s other misdemeanor convictions were not
so litigated. Therefore, BIA erred when it concluded that McNeil was an aggravated felon.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm, in part, the BIA’s judgment that
McNeil is ineligible for withholding of removal and cancellation of removal. We also find
McNeil ineligible for relief under CAT. On the question of asylum, we will vacate the
BIA’s finding that McNeil’s past conviction of criminal sale of marijuana constituted an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) and remand this case to the BIA with
instructions to refer the case to the IJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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